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Companies? 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether corporate governance has an impact on dividend policy in Australian 
listed firms. The empirical studies of corporate governance and dividend policy in the Australian context 
tend to have a limited scope and the findings are mixed. Unlike the existing literature, this paper provides 
a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between dividend policy and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Using a sample of 1,438 firm-year observations for the period of 2005 to 2011 
and the panel data approach, this study finds that dividend payout is significantly positively (negatively) 
correlated with board size, board independence, institutional ownership and use of a Big-4 audit firm (CEO 
duality and managerial ownership). Moreover, dividend yield is significantly positively (negatively) 
correlated with managerial ownership (foreign ownership). These findings suggest that dividend policy 
and corporate governance mechanisms are complementary i.e. firms paying higher dividends are more 
likely to engage in good governance practices as well as having strong monitoring and control systems in 
place and therefore both dividend policy and corporate governance are considered as effective tools in 
reducing agency costs. 
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The dividend policy is one of the most debatable issues in corporate finance 
literature. It attracts particularly the interest of shareholders being a major 
financial policy and decision that matters to business. Notably, dividend policy 
varies over time, between firms and across countries, especially between 
developed and emergent capital markets. In countries governed by Common 
Law regulations with strong shareholder protection, companies distribute 
higher dividends than those in Civil Law countries with weaker shareholder 
protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000). Maury 
and Pajuste (2002) used two approaches to explain how dividend policy 
mitigates agency problems.  The first method is the outcomes model. This 
approach considers dividend policy as a result of the conflict between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders; and between managers (the agent) 
and shareholders (the principal). The second method is the substitute model. 
This approach argues that manager opportunism can be reduced by appropriate 
dividend policies. The substitution model suggests that firms with weak 
minority interests try to establish a reputation by paying dividends (La Porta 
et al., 2000). Easterbrook (1984) asserts that the dividend policy may be used 
to reduce agency cost and mitigate agency conflict between minority and 
majority shareholders by restraining expropriations by senior management 
and removing corporate wealth from the control of top managers (Faccio, 
Lang, & Young, 2001). Further, Mehrani et al. (2011) point out that corporate 
governance is a factor affecting dividend policy. 
 
Australia is a developed economy in the Asia-Pacific region with a strong 
financial market providing strong legal protection for shareholders. The 
Australian financial market follows the Anglo-American system of corporate 
governance. The Corporate Governance Council published the ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles (first edition) in 2003, (ASX, 2003). A 
subsequent revision was released in 2007 and new recommendations on 
diversity and the composition of the remuneration committee were added in 
2010 (second edition). The practices of corporate governance have been 
widely studied in Australia, however, the research that links corporate 
governance to dividend policy is still scarce. Cotter and Silvester (2003), 
Setia- Atmaja, Tanewski, and Skully (2009), Alias, Rahim, Nor, and 
Yaacob (2012) and Yarram and Dollery (2015) are among the few studies 
that investigated the relationship between dividend payout behaviour and 
internal corporate governance mechanisms. In the early study, Cotter and 
Silvester (2003) found no relationship between board independence and 
dividend policy among large ASX listed companies. In contrast, Setia-Atmaja 
et al. (2009), Alias et al. (2012) and Yarram and Dollery (2015) documented 
a significant positive relationship between board independence and dividend 
payout. Thus, the question whether good corporate governance practises to 
have a higher proportion of independent board of director will yield more 
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The motivation of this study derives from the need to demonstrate how 
dividend policy can help corporate governance practices to mitigate agency 
conflict and protect the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders. This 
implies whether dividend policy and corporate governance practices play 
complementary roles in reducing agency costs that have far-reaching 
implications for shareholders, investors and stakeholders in a firm. A strong 
relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance practices can 
be perceived that firms paying higher dividends are more likely to engage in 
good governance practices and vice versa. These firms are well equipped with 
strong monitoring and control systems to safeguard against managerial 
opportunism and tunnelling of fund. Therefore, the motivation and 
contribution of the study are of four folds. First, previously Australian studies 
tend to focus on the impact of board independence on dividend payout 
decision. However, our study offers a more comprehensive examination of the 
relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms 
in all aspects of board independence, board size, board meeting frequency, 
CEO duality, audit committee independence, audit quality, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and government 
ownership. To our best knowledge, there is limited research particularly on the 
relationship between audit committee independence, audit quality and 
managers' dividend payout decision. 
 
Second, the empirical evidence of corporate governance and dividend policy 
in the Australian context not only has a limited scope but also the findings are 
mixed. For example, the findings of board independence and dividend payout 
are contrary between Cotter and Silvester (2003) and Setia-Atmaja et al. 
(2009), Alias et al. (2012), and Yarram and Dollery (2015). Therefore, we are 
motivated to re-examine the issue and to add more evidence to the existing 
literature.  
 
Third, Yarram and Dollery (2015) suggest that CEO duality has a significant 
positive influence on the dividend payout of Australian dividend paying firms. 
Unlike Yarram and Dollery (2015), we also consider a full sample including 
both dividend paying firms and non-dividend paying firms to investigate to 
what extent CEO duality has been an effective corporate governance 
mechanism in monitoring managers; or whether CEO duality is simply a 
reflection of managerial opportunistic behaviour when it comes to the decision 
whether or not firm should pay dividends to existing shareholders.  
 
Fourth, contrasting with Shamsabadi, Min and Chung (2016) who use 
aggregate governance index, we take into account the dynamic effect of 
corporate governance that not all the corporate governance mechanisms are 
effective in assuring that managers will exercise decision in the best interesting 
of shareholders. Therefore, instead of focusing on the aggregate corporate 
governance index, the interplay between the individual elements of corporate 
governance is crucial because different board characteristics may have a 
different impact on decision making as whether to pay or not to pay dividends 
and how much cash should be distributed in the form of dividend. Our 
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approach by taking a comprehensive examination of 11 individual corporate 
governance mechanisms captures the dynamic relations between governance 
and dividend policy. We argue that firms paying higher dividends could signal 
good governance practices and management commitment in reducing free 
cash flows and hence reducing agency costs. 
 
Using a sample of 1,438 firm-year observations for the period 2005 to 2011 
and the panel data approach, this study reports the significant positive 
associations between dividend payout and board size, board independence, 
institutional ownership, and Big-4 audit firm. However, dividend payout is 
found to have a significant negative relationship with CEO duality and 
managerial ownership. Moreover, when dividend policy is measured by 
dividend yield, managerial ownership shows a significant positive impact 
while foreign ownership is significant negative. The findings of the 
relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy have 
important implications for companies, investors and policy makers. These 
results imply that board size, board independence, institutional ownership, 
Big-4 firms, and dividend policy can play complementary governance roles 
and provide more benefits to shareholders and investors. Firms that pay higher 
dividends are more likely to display good governance of the monitoring and 
control systems in place. Therefore, both dividend policy and corporate 
governance are considered an effective tool in reducing agency costs in 
Australian firms. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 considers the literature review, 
conceptual framework and hypotheses development; Section 3 describes the 
research method covering data sources and sample selection, variable 
measurement and model development; Section 4 presents and discusses the 
results; and Section 5 reports the conclusion and implication of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
2.1 Board structure and dividend policy 
 
Board structure is an important factor that may influence a firm’s payout 
policy. Board structure includes its size and the proportion of directors who 
are independent. The board of directors plays a vital role in protecting 
shareholders’ interests and ultimately decides a firm’s dividend payout. A 
number of empirical studies have tested the relationship between board 
structure and dividend policy but, nonetheless, the results are mixed. Elmagrhi 
et al. (2017) examines a sample of UK small and medium-sized enterprises 
from the period of 2010 to 2013 and they find that board size and audit 
committee size are significantly positively associated with the level of 
dividend payout. La Porta et al. (2000), Mitton (2004), Kowalewski et al. 
(2008), and Yarram and Dollery (2015) show that companies with good   
governance practices pay higher dividends. However, other studies such as 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Gugler (2003) and Jiraporn and Ning (2006) 
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show that firms with poor governance pay higher dividends. Bathala and Rao 
(1995) and Borokhovich et al. (2005) examine the relationship between 
corporate governance characteristics and dividend policy in US firms and 
report a significant negative relationship between board independence and 
dividend payout ratio. Similar findings were discovered by Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey (2009), Asamoah (2011), Al-Shabibi and Ramesh (2011), Bathala 
and Rao (1995), and Benjamin and Zain (2015). 
 
Other studies have found a positive relationship between board independence 
and dividend policy. Schellenger et al. (1989) examined the effect of board 
composition on the dividend payout for a sample of 526 US companies and 
found a significant positive relationship between board composition and 
dividend policy. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) studied 160 US firms during the 
period from 1980 to 1983 and found that outside directors are less likely to 
reduce dividend payout which is consistent with Schellenger et al. (1989). 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) also confirm that board independence is 
significant positively related to dividend policy. Alias et al. (2012) found a 
significant positive impact of board independence on dividends. In Australia, 
Cotter and Silvester (2003) analysed 109 large companies listed on the ASX 
in 1997 to examine whether board independence affected dividend policy. The 
results indicated board independence has no relationship with dividend policy. 
Yarram and Dollery (2015) found evidence that board independence 
positively affects dividend payout. 
 
In addition, Belden et al. (2005) investigated the relationship between outside 
directors and dividend payout for 524 large companies listed in the Forbes 500 
for the years 1998 to 2000. They showed that firms with a higher proportion of 
outside directors prefer to pay higher levels of dividends. Abdelsalam et al. 
(2008) examined the top 50 firms on the Egyptian Stock Exchange from 2003 
to 2005 and their findings reveal that institutional ownership has a significant 
positive association with dividend policy, while board composition has no 
relationship with dividend payout. Elmagrhi et al. (2017) document a 
significant negative effect of frequency of board meeting on the level of 
dividend payout in the UK listed SMEs. Benjamin and Zain (2015) also 
reported firms that meet more frequently usually pay lower dividends. On the 
contrary, a positive view in the literature is that more frequency of board 
meetings is beneficial for firms as part of their board monitoring and good 
corporate governance practice. Based on the above discussion, the hypotheses 
relating to board size, board independence and board meeting are developed: 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and board 
size.  
H1b: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and board 
independence. 
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2.2 CEO duality and dividend policy 
 
According to Agency theory, the separation of board chairman and CEO 
functions will reduce agency costs and improve firm performance. Moreover, 
the duality of CEO and board chair is one of the most controversial issues in 
corporate governance literature. On the contrary, Stewardship Theory argues 
that leaders are trustworthy, they are not opportunistic and they act in the 
interests of the company. Advocates of duality argue that CEOs will have a 
strong leadership in their dual roles and tend to produce a superior firm 
performance. A number of researchers have investigated the association 
between CEO duality and dividend policy. Using a sample of 2,081 firms 
covering the period from 1992 to 2000, Hu and Kumar (2004) examined the 
effects of internal governance mechanisms on dividend payout. The results 
show a significant positive association between CEO duality and dividend 
policy. Similarly, Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) found a positive relationship 
between CEO duality and dividend payout among real estate investment trusts. 
Feng et al. (2007) and Gill and Obradovich (2013) report that CEO duality has 
a significant positive effect on dividend policy. Chen et al. (2017) also find a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and dividend payout, suggesting 
firms with combined leadership tend to pay high dividends in order to 
substitute for poor governance reputation. These empirical findings by large 
are consistent with the substitute theory. However, Sharma (2011) has an 
opposite finding that shows a negative association between CEO duality and 
dividend payout policy. Baliga et al. (1996) and Dittmar et al. (2003) found 
that firms with CEO duality are less effective. CEO duality is negatively 
correlated with the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, and 
weak corporate governance mechanisms lead to a higher level of agency cost 
(D’Souza & Saxena, 1999). The negative association between the CEO duality 
and corporate dividend policy was also found by Asamoah (2011), Chen et 
al. (2011), Subramaniam and Devi (2011), Alias et al. (2012) and Abor and 
Fiador (2013). Moreover, Elmagrhi et al. (2017) examines a sample of UK 
small and medium-sized enterprises listed on the Alternative Investment 
Market and they find that CEO role duality has no impact on the level of 
dividend payout. Considering the mixed findings in the literature, we develop 
the following hypothesis: 
 




2.3 Audit committee independence and dividend policy 
 
The audit committee plays a key role in corporate governance and 
safeguarding the financial interest of shareholders (Abbott et al., 2004). In the 
vein of Agency theory, Erickson et al. (2003) argued that audit committee 
independence reduces agency costs. To our best knowledge, there is limited 
research on the relationship between audit committee and dividend policy and 
the tests of audit committee independence and dividend payout are 
inconclusive. For example, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that dividend policy 
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has a significant negative relationship with governance mechanisms. Chen et 
al. (2005) found a marginally significant negative association between audit 
committee independence and dividend payout. Sawicki (2009) found that 
dividends act as a substitute mechanism for other governance mechanisms in 
pre-crises contexts; however, a positive association exists between dividend 
and corporate governance in post-crises situations. This means that the 
dividend can be used as a substitute for governance mechanisms. Turley and 
Zaman (2007) examined the effectiveness of audit committees in UK 
companies and found that audit committee is not that important an internal 
control. In a recent study, Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2014) found no significant 
relationship between audit committee independence and cash dividends in the 
UK. Similarly, Nimer et al. (2012) found no significant relationship between 
audit committee independence and dividend payout policies. However, the 
independence of audit committees increases its strength and reduces the 
agency problem and the opportunity to misappropriate funds by insiders (Yeh, 
Chung, & Liu, 2011). Based on the mixed findings in the literature, the 
hypothesis is formulated as: 
 




2.4 Ownership structure and dividend policy 
 
Board structure is not the only factor influencing a firm’s payout policy. 
Researchers suggest that ownership structure, for example, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership and foreign 
ownership may also affect dividend policy decisions. Rozeff (1982) and 
Farinha (2003) analysed the association between managerial ownership and 
dividend policy and they found that managerial ownership is negatively 
related with dividend policy. This is because managers tend to minimize 
dividends in order to increase their personal benefits such as compensations 
(e.g., Eckbo & Verma, 1994; Moh’d, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995; Short, Zhang, 
& Keasey, 2002). McConnell and Servaes (1990), Short et al. (2002), Manos 
(2003), Chen et al. (2005) also provide evidence that managerial ownership is 
negatively related to dividend payout. 
 
Apart from managerial ownership, institutional shareholders may also have an 
impact on a firm's dividend policy. Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory points 
out that institutional investors play an effective role in monitoring managers 
as they will put pressure on managers to distribute free cash flow as dividends. 
Dividends, therefore, can be also viewed as the reward to compensate 
institutional investors for monitoring management activities (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). However, empirical studies of the relationship between 
institutional ownership and dividend policy show mixed results, for example 
including Alli, Khan, and Ramirez (1993), Moh'd et al. (1995), Short et al. 
(2002), Grinstein and Michaely (2005), and Khan (2006). In the emerging 
markets, Abdelsalam et al. (2008), Sharif et al. (2010), and Al-Nawaiseh 
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(2013) find a significant positive relationship. On the other hand, Han et al. 
(1999), Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), 
Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006), Kouki and Guizani (2009), Mehrani et al. 
(2011), and Gill and Obradovich (2013) find a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and dividend payout. In addition, Zeckhauser and 
Pound (1990) and Al-Najjar (2010) show no significant association between 
institutional shareholders and dividend policy. 
 
Government ownership is also documented to have an impact on a firm's 
dividend policy. Gul (1999) provided evidence that the number of shares 
owned by the government is significant positively associated with dividend 
policy. A similar relationship was found by Al-Malkawi (2007) that a higher 
level of government ownership is associated with higher levels of cash 
dividends. Other studies, such as Wei, Zhang, and Xiao (2004) and Bradford, 
Chen, and Zhu (2013) also show a significant positive association between the 
number of shares owned by government and dividend policy. 
 
Foreign investors may also influence the level of dividend payout. Firms with 
higher proportions of shares held by foreign investors are more likely to pay 
higher dividends (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Gedailovic, Yoshikawa, 
and Hashimoto (2005) found that the number of shares owned by foreign 
investors has a significant positive relationship with the level of dividends. 
Similarly, Jeon, Lee, and Moffett (2011) confirm a significant positive effect 
of foreign investors on dividend policy. The positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and dividend policy is also supported by Kang and Stulz 
(1997), Manos (2003), Chai (2010), Jeon et al. (2011), Warrad, Abed, 
Khriasat, and Al-Sheikh (2012), Chiang and Lai (2013), and Gong (2015). 
Thus, we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
H4a: There is a negative relationship between dividend policy and 
managerial ownership. 
H4b: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and 
institutional ownership. 
H4c: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and 
government ownership. 




2.5 External audit and dividend policy 
 
Mitton (2004) found a significant positive relationship between audit quality 
as measured by Big-4 audits and dividend policy. Similarly, Trang (2012) 
found that audit quality has a significant positive effect on dividend policy. 
Big-4 audit firms tend to provide quality-auditing services because they are 
highly skilled with more experiences and incentives to defend their reputation 
(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002; Fan & Wong, 2005; 
Kane & Velury, 2004; Piot, 2005). Deshmukh (2003) reports that companies 
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with weak audit quality are more likely to show information asymmetry and 
pay lower cash dividends. This implies there should be a significant positive 
association between audit quality, as measured by involvement of Big-4 
audits, and dividend polices. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 




3. Research Method and Data 
 
This study collected data from multiple secondary sources. The financial data 
are hand-collected from the annual reports published by Australian listed 
companies. Corporate governance data are collected from DataStream and 
SIRCA databases. The final sample is a balanced panel data set consisting of 
1,438 firm-year observations for 206 listed companies across the period from 
2005 to 2011. The main reason for this sample period is the adoption of ASX 
Corporate Governance Guidelines in 2003 (first edition) and its subsequent 
revision in 2007 and 2010 (second edition) rather than third edition (2014) or 
fourth edition (2019) that include wide range of recommendations. These 
guidelines are generally voluntary in nature that firms have followed since 
then. The base period 2005 represents corporate governance practices with 
one-year lag from 2003 while 2011 being the last period before a 
comprehensive review of guidelines occurred in 2012 reflecting global 
developments on corporate governance (ASX, 2013). In addition, the study 
period 2005-2011 represents relatively stable economic conditions, 
notwithstanding Global Financial Crisis (GFC), with series of interest rate cuts 
as well as volatility spikes in the stock market and exchange rate fluctuations 
from time to time. 
 
With panel data pooled OLS regression, the estimation may be problematic 
because the process ignores the panel structure and only treats data as cross-
sectional (Arellano & Honoré, 2001; Roodman, 2009). Many empirical studies 
have used OLS regression to estimate the relationship between corporate 
governance and dividend policy. However, the OLS estimates are inconsistent 
and inefficient if there exists heterogeneity across firms (Hsiao, 2003). In 
addition, using OLS in a panel data structure may lead to temporary and spatial 
problems and spurious results (Beck & Katz, 1995). The fixed effects model 
may be used to analyse the impact of variables that change over time. The 
fixed effects model removes the effects of those time- invariant characteristics. 
The random effects model can be used to analyse the special features of panel 
data. It is also known as the error components model. In the random effects 
regression, the intercepts are similar for all cross-sectional units and the 
random variation of each entity's intercept is captured by the error term 𝜀ᵢ. In 
choosing whether to use the fixed effects and random effects model, we 
applied the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978; Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The 
null hypothesis is that random effects is preferred and the alternative 
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hypothesis is that fixed effects is preferred. A significant p-value leads to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis and indicates that the fixed effects is more 
appropriate. We model dividend policy as a function of board size, board 
independence, board meeting frequency, CEO duality, audit committee 
independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, government 
ownership, foreign ownership and audit quality. 
 
Dividend Policy = α+β1 BSIZE + β2 BIND + β3 BMEET  
+β4 DUALITY +β5 ACIND+β6 INSID +β7 INS +β8 
STATE +β9 FRGN +β10 BIG-4 +∑ X+ µ 
 
Where, dividend policy is a dependent variable measured by dividend payout 
ratio (POUT) and dividend yield (DY). The independent variables are 
corporate governance variables and include board size (BSIZE), board 
independence (BIND), board meetings (BMEET), CEO duality (DUALITY), 
audit committee independence (ACIND), managerial ownership (INSID), 
institutional ownership (INS), government ownership (STATE), foreign 
ownership (FRGN), and audit quality (BIG-4). ∑X is a vector of other control 
variables and includes firm size, leverage, growth prospect, firm risk, firm age 
and profitability, and µ is the error term. Table 1 below provides the 
measurement of variables and data sources.
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Table 1: Variable Measurements and Data Sources 
 
 





The percentage of earnings paid to shareholders in dividends. 
Calculated as the dividends per share divided by 
earnings per share. 
 
POUT 
DataStream & Annual Reports 




Board Size The board size for firm i in time t. It is calculated as the 
numbers of board directors. 
BSIZE DataStream, Sirca 
& Annual Reports 
Board 
Independence 
The independent of board of directors for firm i in time t. It 
is calculated as the proportion of outside independent directors. 
BIND DataStream, Sirca & Annual Reports 
Board Meetings Calculated as the numbers of board directors meeting 
during a financial year t. 
BMEET Annual Reports 
CEO Duality Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm’s CEO is 
the Chairman of the Board of Directors, and 0 otherwise. 




The proportion of independent directors on the audit committee for firm i in 
time t. 
ACIND DataStream & Annual Reports 
Managerial 
Ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by board of directors for 
firm i in time t. 
INSID Annual Reports 
 
 




The percentage of shares owned by institutions investors 
for firm i in time t. 
INS Annual Reports 
Government 
Ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by government for firm i 
in time t. 
STATE Annual Reports 
Foreign 
Ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals 
and institutional investors for firm i in time t. 
FORGN Annual Reports 
Audit Quality Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm is audited by a 
big four audit firm, and 0 otherwise. 
BIG_4 Annual Reports 
 
Control variables 
Firm Size Calculated as the natural logarithm of the total assets for 
firm i in time t. 
FSIZE DataStream 
Leverage Ratio Calculated by total liabilities over total assets for the firm i 
in time t. 
LR DataStream 
Growth Calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
market value per share to its book value per share. 
MBVE DataStream 
Firm Risk Standard deviation of earnings (Beta). It is calculated as 
the historical beta local index for firm i in time t. 
FRISK DataStream 
Firm Age Calculated as the number of years elapsed since the firm 
was incorporated. 
FAGE Company Website 
Profitability Calculated as the earnings before taxes to book value of 




The industry classification is based on Global Industry Classification 
Standards (GICS) for Australian listed 
companies and equals to 1 if firm i is from the GICS industry, and 0 otherwise. 
INDS- DUM ASX Website 
Year Dummy Year dummy equals to 1 if year 2005, and 0 otherwise. YR-DUM  
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the study. Panel 
A shows that the mean (median) values of POUT and DY are 58% (60%) and 
5% (4%) respectively. Panel B shows that average board size (BSIZE) and 
board independence (BIND) of Australian firms is between 7 to 8 directors 
with 59.7% independent members. The average number of board meetings 
(BMEET) is 9 to 10 times in a year. Only 4.2% of the Australian firms are 
characterized as CEO-Chairman duality, which means that most Australian 
firms have separate positions for a chairman and chief executive officer. The 
mean (median) of the proportion of audit committee independence is 85.7% 
(100%). More than 80% of firms use Big-4 audit firms that indicates high audit 
committee independence and high audit quality. In the ownership categories, 
it appears that both institutional (25.2%) and foreign ownerships (28.1%) are 
dominating over insider managerial ownership (15.2%). 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation between corporate governance mechanisms and 
dividend variables for Australian firms. The results suggest that the degree of 
correlation between the independent variables is low which suggests there are 
no multi-collinearity problems between independent variables. This study 
also used the variance inflation factors (VIF) of variables to determine if the 
multi-collinearity problem exists between independent variables. Again, 
coefficients of correlation are within an acceptable range of VIF results 1.03 
– 1.50 for Australian listed firms, that are smaller than 10 (see Appendix). The 
results of VIF support the Pearson’s correlation coefficients and provide no 
indication of multi-collinearity problems in the regression models.  
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Panel A: dividend policy           
Dividend Payout Ratio (POUT) 1438 0.577 0.274 0.400 0.600 0.790 0.000 1.000 -0.4305 2.3917 
Dividend Yield (DY) 1438 0.045 0.034 0.024 0.040 0.059 0.000 0.279 2.0136 10.4808 
Panel B: Corporate Governance Variables           
Board Size (BSIZE) 1438 7.640 2.706 6.000 7.000 9.000 2.000 23.000 0.7328 4.1862 
Board Independence (BIND) 1438 0.597 0.196 0.500 0.625 0.750 0.000 1.000 -0.3483 2.3447 
Board Meetings (BMEET) 1438 9.578 4.839 6.000 9.000 12.000 0.000 37.000 0.9695 4.9990 
CEO Duality (DUALITY) 1438 0.042 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 4.5837 22.0102 
Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) 1438 0.857 0.205 0.750 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 -1.2698 3.7178 
Managerial Ownership (INSID) 1438 0.152 0.112 0.070 0.120 0.210 0.000 0.770 1.2524 4.9040 
Institutional Ownership (INS) 1438 0.252 0.126 0.159 0.232 0.332 0.029 0.872 1.0171 5.1582 
Government Ownership (STATE) 1438 0.005 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.520 10.1012 112.9688 
Foreign Ownership (FORGN) 1438 0.281 0.134 0.180 0.270 0.378 0.000 0.930 0.3716 2.9904 
Audit Quality (BIG-4) 1438 0.808 0.394 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 -1.5645 3.4477 
Panel C: Control Variables           
Log Firm Size (FSIZE) 1438 13.101 2.257 11.500 13.140 14.800 4.750 18.930 -0.1042 2.7421 
Leverage Ratio (LR) 1438 0.235 0.204 0.089 0.213 0.332 -1.634 1.653 0.6768 14.6667 
Log Growth (MBVE) 1438 0.758 0.786 0.223 0.732 1.255 -1.897 3.999 0.1674 3.4091 
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Firm Age (FAGE) 1438 43.258 42.106 13.000 26.000 56.000 0.000 187.00 1.3925 3.9935 
Profitability (ROA) 1438 0.053 0.240 0.006 0.068 0.145 -1.727 1.351 -1.6206 13.0262 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation of Variables (N = 1438) 
 
 POUT DY BSIZE BIND BMEET CEO Duality ACIND INSID INS STATE FORGN BIG-4 LOG FSIZE LR 
POUT 1.000              
DY 0.495*** 1.000             
BSIZE 0.042* 0.070*** 1.000            
BIND 0.080*** 0.002 -0.012 1.000           
BMEET 0.101*** 0.074*** 0.191*** 0.108*** 1.000          
CEO DUALITY -0.025 -0.045* -0.008 -0.085*** -0.088*** 1.000         
ACIND -0.010 0.018 -0.054** 0.098*** 0.007 0.006 1.000        
INSID -0.033 -0.009 0.018 -0.114*** -0.018 0.193*** -0.001 1.000       
INS 0.044* -0.040 0.003 0.004 -0.080*** -0.023 -0.004 -0.008 1.000      
STATE 0.017 0.024 -0.045* 0.032 0.072*** -0.027 -0.038 -0.072*** -0.024 1.000     
FORGN 0.021 0.015 0.020 -0.026 0.071*** -0.030 0.048** 0.033 -0.033 0.017 1.000    
BIG-4 0.168*** 0.076*** 0.287*** 0.153*** 0.242*** -0.013 0.027 -0.012 0.002 0.035 0.121*** 1.000   
LOG FSIZE 0.096*** 0.041 0.385*** 0.205*** 0.382*** -0.104*** 0.078*** -0.063** -0.078*** 0.112*** 0.085*** 0.443*** 1.000  
LR 0.097*** 0.085*** 0.065** 0.078*** 0.174*** -0.072*** -0.016 0.067** -0.016 0.011 -0.034 0.138*** 0.300*** 1.000 
LOG MBVE 0.044* 0.213*** -0.012 -0.019 -0.108*** 0..008 -0.032 0.047* 0.127*** 0.017 0.001 -0.007 -0.129*** -0.046* 
FRISK -0.104*** -0.047* -0.072*** -0.109*** -0.091*** 0.081*** -0.067** 0.003 -0.066** -0.004 -0.034 -0.155*** -0.225*** -0.140*** 
FAGE 0.060** -0.059** 0.218*** 0190*** 0.090*** -0.030 0.010 -0.139*** 0.022 0.047* -0.062** 0.205*** 0.396*** 0.059** 
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ROA 0.004 -0.065*** 0.120*** 0.069*** 0.129*** -0.077*** -0.009 0.044* 0.001 0.014 0.057** 0.178*** 0.282*** 0.103*** 
*** Denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-talied); ** Denotes correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-talied); * Denotes correlation is significant at the level 
0.10 level (2-talied). All variables are as previously defined. 
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FRISK FAGE ROA 
LOG MBVE 1.000    
FRISK 0.020 1.000   
FAGE -0.019 -0.0210*** 1.000  
ROA 0.108*** -0.107*** 0.098*** 1.000 
*** Denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-talied); ** Denotes correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level (2-talied); * Denotes correlation is significant at the level 0.10 level (2-talied). All variables 
are as previously defined. 
 
4.2 Panel regression results 
 
Tables 4 and 5 present the panel regression results for the relationship between 
corporate governance variables and dividend policy for Australian firms. Both 
the pooled OLS and panel (i.e. random and fixed-effects) regression results 
are shown to enable comparisons between results. 
 
Table 4 presents both the pooled OLS and random effect (RE) regression 
results of the relationship between corporate governance variables and 
dividend policy measured by dividend payout (POUT). The first test Lagrange 
Multiplier Test is 971.26 with the P-value at the 1% significance level. This 
means that the panel model is better than the pooled OLS model. In addition, 
the Hausman Test for regression is 22.83 with the P-value equal to 0.4111, 
which is insignificant, thus supporting that the random effects model is more 
efficient than the fixed effects model. Both the OLS and RE models yield 
similar the results. Board size (BSIZE) and board independence (BIND) have 
significant positive effects on dividend policy, indicating that firms with a 
large board size and more independent directors are more likely to pay higher 
dividends. The result of board meeting (BMEET) in the RE model is different 
to the finding in the OLS regression. It is positive but not statistically 
significant at any levels. Again, the result of the RE model is similar to the 
finding in the OLS regression showing significant negative relationships 
between CEO duality and dividend policy. With respect to the ownership 
variables, the results of the RE regression suggest that institutional ownership 
(INS) has a significant positive relationship with POUT. However, managerial 
ownership (INSID) has a significant negative effect on POUT, indicating that 
the greater managerial ownership, the lower the dividend payout. In addition, 
the results of the RE model show that an audit firm (BIG-4) has a significant 
positive effect on dividend policy and this result is similar to the pooled OLS 
results. However, unlike the pooled OLS results, firm age (FAGE) and 
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Table 4: Panel Regression Results of the Relationship between 
Corporate  Governance Mechanisms and Dividend Policy (POUT) 
 
Independent Variables Pooled OLS Model Random Effects Model 
Const. 0.583*** (9.06) 0.512*** (5.72) 
BSIZE 0.004* (1.82) 0.002* (1.67) 
BIND 0.035** (1.97) 0.017** (2.02) 
BMEET 0.004** (2.25) 0.001 (0.69) 
DUALITY -0.005* (-1.68) -0.011* (-1.71) 
ACIND -0.043 (-1.25) -0.014 (-0.51) 
INSID -0.143*** (-2.39) -0.007** (-2.11) 
INS 0.081* (1.63) 0.026* (1.79) 
STATE -0.123 (-0.74) -0.271 (-1.01) 
FORGN -0.028 (-0.49) -0.050 (-1.01) 
BIG-4 0.061*** (2.88) 0.016*** (2.97) 
LOG FSIZE 0.001 (0.08) 0.004 (0.66) 
LR 0.046 (1.42) 0.031 (0.75) 
LOG MBVE 0.011 (1.14) 0.009 (0.97) 
FRISK -0.005 (-0.54) 0.005 (0.59) 
FAGE 0.001* (1.80) 0.001 (1.02) 
ROA 0.099*** (3.05) 0.027 (1.00) 
INDS-DUM Yes Yes 
YR-DUM Yes Yes 
Observations 1438 1438 
Adj-R-square 0.114 0.140 
Lagrange Multiplier test  971.26*** 
Lagrange Multiplier test (0.000) 
(P-value)  
Hausman test 22.83 
Hausman test (P-value) (0.411) 
Note: ***, **, * represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. T-
statistics are in the parenthesis. All variables are as previously defined. 
 
Table 5 presents the panel regression results of the association between 
governance mechanisms and dividend policy measured by dividend yield 
(DY). The Lagrange Multiplier Test is 345.55 and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, indicating that the panel models are more appropriate than the 
pooled OLS model. Again, the Hausman Test is 36.98 with the P-value 
significant at the 5% level. This result supports that the fixed effects (FE) 
model is preferred over the RE model. Using DY as the dividend policy 
measure, the results of FE regression show that board size (BSIZE) and board 
meeting (BMEET) have no significant positive influence on DY. This is 
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inconsistent with the results from the pooled OLS model. Similarly, CEO 
duality has no significant effect in the FE model. However, the results of the 
FE model show that insider managerial ownership (INSID) has a significant 
positive influence on DY, and foreign ownership (FORGN) has a significant 
negative influence on DY but Big-4 shows no effect in the FE model. With 
respect to control variables, both OLS and FE regressions show that market to 
book value (MBVE) and firm risk (FRISK) have significant negative effects 
on DY, indicating that firms with unstable profitability may have more 
fluctuations in the firm's stock price and, hence, are more likely to pay lower 
dividends. Again, unlike pooled OLS estimates, leverage ratio (LR) and 
profitability (ROA) have no significant effect in the FE regression. 
 
Table 5: Panel Regression Results of the Relationship between 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Dividend Policy (DY) 
 
Independent Variables Pooled OLS Model Fixed Effects Model 
Const. 0.054*** (7.68)  
BSIZE 0.001*** (3.75) -0.0001 (-0.52) 
BIND -0.007 (-1.58) -0.004 (-0.81) 
BMEET 0.001** (1.94) 0.001 (0.41) 
DUALITY -0.007* (-1.87) -0.002 (-0.44) 
ACIND 0.001 (0.14) 0.002 (0.58) 
INSID -0.03 (-0.47) 0.032*** (2.89) 
INS 0.005 (0.93) 0.001 (0.31) 
STATE -0.002 (-0.11) 0.026 (0.46) 
FORGN -0.007 (-0.92) -0.012* (-1.65) 
BIG-4 0.006*** (2.42) -0.004 (-0.67) 
LOG FSIZE 0.0001 (0.03) 0.0001 (0.28) 
LR 0.008** (2.12) -0.002 (-0.30) 
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LOG MBVE -0.006*** (-5.60) -0.004*** (-2.55) 
FRISK -0.002* (-1.67) -0.002* (-1.70) 
FAGE -0.0001 (1.58) -0.004 (-0.26) 
ROA 0.012*** (3.05) 0.003 (0.78) 
INDS-DUM Yes No 
YR-DUM Yes Yes 
Observations 1438 1438 
Adj-R-square 0.163 0.164 
Lagrange Multiplier test 
Lagrange Multiplier test (P-
value) 
Hausman test 





Note: ***, **, * represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. T-statistics are in the parenthesis. 
All variables are as previously defined. 
 
5. Discussion on Panel Regression Results 
 
This study examined whether the corporate governance variables affect dividend measures in 
Australian listed firms. The regression results of panel models show that board size (BSIZE), board 
independence (BIND), CEO duality (DUALITY), managerial ownership (INSID), institutional 
ownership (INS), foreign ownership (FORGN) and audit firms (Big-4) have significant 
relationships with dividend policy. The significant positive relationship between board size 
(BSIZE) and dividend payout is consistent with the argument that board size can influence a firm’s 
dividend policy, that is, the larger the number of board members in Australian firms, the higher the 
dividend payout. The result suggests increasing the board size would increase shareholders’ wealth 
significantly. Large Australian firms tend to have a large sized board but they also have widespread 
shareholdings and higher degrees of agency costs. So one explanation is that those firms paying 
higher dividends have good governance and monitoring and control mechanisms in place. This 
result is consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. (2000a) who predicted that a large board 
would provide a better governance environment, and thus ensure higher dividends. The obtained 
results are also consistent with the findings of Bokpin (2011), Chen et al. (2011), Gill, and 
Obradovich (2012). Therefore, this study supports the hypothesis H1a. 
 
Similarly, board independence (BIND) has a significant positive influence on dividend policy, 
implying the higher proportion of board independence in Australian firms can encourage a higher 
dividend policy. This finding supports the argument that more active involvement of independent 
directors would lead to greater protection of shareholders’ interests and thus result in higher 
dividends. A significant positive relationship between board independence and dividend policy 
could be viewed strongly as both mechanisms play a similarly important role in corporate 
governance in Australian firms. The result is consistent with Easterbrook (1984), Schellenger et 
al. (1989), and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) who document strong evidence that the board 





independence influences dividend policy. Therefore, this study supports hypothesis H1b that 
Australian firms with a higher number of independent directors on the board tend to pay higher 
dividends.  
 
The study finds a significant negative relationship between CEO duality (DUALITY) and dividend 
policy, suggesting that Australian firms with CEO duality tend to pay lower dividends compared 
to firms who separate the roles of CEO and board chairman. In other words, firms with role 
separation in CEO and board chairman are more likely to protect shareholders’ interests, and hence 
pay more dividends. The negative significant relationship between CEO duality and dividend 
policy is consistent with the findings of Baliga et al. (1996) and Dittmar et al. (2003). Therefore, 
the hypothesis H2 is supported.  
 
With respect to ownership variables, the finding is consistent with the argument that managerial 
ownership and dividends could act as a substitutive monitoring device. The negative relationship 
between managerial ownership (INSID) and dividend policy suggests that the greater the 
managerial ownership the lower the payout. One possible reason is that managers with higher 
ownership tend to behave opportunistically and self-interest driven, and when making finance 
decisions managers are more likely to use free cash flows for their own benefits rather than paying 
higher dividends. This finding is consistent with those of Rozeff (1982), Jensen (1986), Eckbo and 
Verma (1994), Moh'd et al. (1995), Short et al. (2002), Chen et al. (2005), and Mehrani et al. 
(2011). Therefore, the hypothesis H4a is marginally supported that Australian companies with 
high managerial ownership prefer lower levels of payout, but higher levels of dividend yield. 
Again, this study finds a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership (INS) 
and dividend policy, which implies that firms with a higher percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors are more likely to pay higher dividends. The positive relationship also 
suggests that institutional ownership and dividend policy are not substitute monitoring 
mechanisms rather they perform complementary governance roles in Australia. This result is 
consistent with those found by Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Moh'd et al. (1995), Short et al. 
(2002). However, it is different from signalling theory that proposes that institutional investors 
and dividends may be viewed as substitute signalling devices (Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990). 
Therefore, hypothesis H4b is supported. Further, the findings of this study show that Big-4 
affiliated audit firms have a significant positive influence on dividend policy, suggesting that high 
audit quality may restrict opportunistic behaviour of mangers and boards of directors, decrease 
information symmetry, and hence restore investors' confidence. This result is consistent with those 
found by Mitton (2002) and Lee, Cox, and Roden (2007). Therefore, the hypothesis H5 is 
supported.  
 
On the other hand, the results show that there is no significant relationship between board meetings 
(BMEET) and dividend policy in Australian firms. Therefore, hypothesis H1c is not supported. 
The results also show that audit committee independence (ACIND) does not have a significant 
effect on dividends. Thus, the good practices of the audit committee have no effect on dividend 
policy. The finding is consistent with Beasley and Salterio (2001), Cotter and Silvester (2003), 
Turley and Zaman (2007), and Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2014) who do not find evidence to support 
a significant effect for the audit committee. This result suggests that looking only at audit 




committee independence may not be sufficient to assess the effectiveness of the audit committee; 
there might be a need to look at other factors such as audit committee financial expertise and 
education of audit committee. Therefore, hypothesis H3 is not supported. This study does not find 
any significant relationship between government (STATE) and dividend policy but finds a 
negative relation for foreign ownership (FORGN). Therefore, the hypothesis H4c is not supported 
while H4d is accepted. 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
 
This study investigated the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, namely board 
characteristics, audit committee and ownership on dividend policy measured as dividend payout 
and dividend yield for 206 ASX listed firms for the period from 2005 to 2011. The purpose is to 
provide a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between dividend policy and 
corporate governance mechanisms in all aspects. Using the random effects model, the results show 
that the corporate governance mechanisms of board size, board independence, institutional 
ownership and audit quality have significant positive influences on firm dividend payout decisions. 
This positive relationship implies that the board and institutional investors use dividends as a 
complementary mechanism to mitigate agency problems in Australian firms. However, the results 
of the random effects model show that CEO duality and managerial ownership have significant 
negative relationships with dividend payout. When dividend yield is used as proxy for firm 
dividend policy, the results from fixed effects model show only managerial ownership and foreign 
ownership have positive but insignificant and significant negative effects respectively. No other 
governance variable has a significant effect on dividend yield, which is contrary to expectations. 
 
The findings of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy have important 
implications for companies, investors and policy makers. It suggests that dividend policy and 
corporate governance mechanisms are complementary, that is firms paying higher dividends are 
more likely to engage in good governance practices as well as having strong monitoring and 
control systems in place. Specifically, board size, board independence, institutional ownership, 
Big-4 firms, and dividend policy can play complementary governance roles and provide more 
benefits to shareholders and investors. On the other hand, shareholders and investors should be 
cautious about CEO duality and managerial ownership, although fewer Australian firms have CEO 
duality, and managerial ownership is at a reasonable level. As such, the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour of managers may not be ruled out when it comes to the decision whether or not they 
should pay dividends to existing shareholders. This study is not without limitations. The tests 
disregard the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as Australia had not been severely 
affected by the GFC but the effect on governance mechanisms and dividend decisions is possible. 
Sample period is also limited up to 2011 covering second edition of the ASX Corporate 
Governance Guidelines rather than third or fourth editions. Future research may extend study 
period up to fourth edition of the ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines covering issues that are 
more complex. Future research may also examine the effects of corporate governance on dividend 
policy for pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. Again, future research can investigate the interactions 
between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure and their 
joint impact on dividend policy. 
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